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Problem area 
Introduction  
In August 1991 Estonia gained its second independence after having belonged to the 
USSR1 since 1940 (Järve 2005: 61f). With this independence some problems emerged 
in regard to the Russian minority in Estonia, which, for most parts, had settled in 
Estonia during the years of the USSR regime. In this project I will study some of the 
problems with the Russian national minority in Estonia in an EU context, looking into 
the historic background of how the minority emerged, and then how the accession 
process of Estonia into the EU, and how the implementation of the EU’s standards and 
criteria on this issue, all have affected the minority rights of the relatively large Russian 
group that lives in Estonia. The EU accession negotiations with Estonia started in 1998, 
they were finalized in 2002 and the membership was accepted in a referendum in 
Estonia in 2003 (EC 3). The acceptance of one of the criteria leading to acceptance of 
Estonia in the EU in the 2004 Enlargement also meant acceptance of Estonia having 
implemented the standards on minority rights as set out by the EU in the Copenhagen 
Criteria, also known as the Accession Criteria. Basically they now live up to the criteria 
for acceptance in the EU, and therefore have, in the EU context, adapted the norms on 
this matter.  
 
As the problems with the Russian minority in Estonia have existed for several years, 
other international organisations have also tried to affect this. This being the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations 
(UN), the Council of Europe (CoE) and others which have standards for and documents 
on human and minority rights. None of these have though been able to offer the same 
incentives as the EU, due to the large material reward which comes with an EU 
membership. (Brosig 2006: 140ff). Therefore the EU has had great opportunity to set 
standards which Estonia has needed to implement, as they have wanted the material 
reward from the EU. It was through the accession negotiations that the EU had the first 
opportunity to influence the change in the policy area in Estonia. It made it possible to 
get an overview of the problems, and to find out in which parts of the policy, changes 
were necessary. The changes in Estonia have thus been subject to some sort of pressure 
                                                   
1 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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from the EU. This pressure is a part of the Europeanization theory, which shows the 
impact on the Estonian policy, how the changes have been affected by the EU, and 
further it shows the outcome of the interaction between EU and Estonia at the domestic 
level. 
 
Problem formulation  
How have rights of the Russian minority in Estonia changed with the impact of 
Europeanization and the implementation of EU standards in this area, in accordance 
with their negotiations with and acceptance in the EU?  
 
Research questions 
• How did the problems with the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, especially 
concerning language and citizenship, emerge? 
• Is there a clash between the standards set out by the EU and the minority rights in 
Estonia? 
• How can Europeanization say something about the domestic impact of EU policies 
on minority rights in Estonia, both in the accession negotiations and after their 
acceptance?  
• How have the rights for the Russian minority in Estonia changed after their 
accession negotiations with, and their acceptance in, the EU? 
 
The historical background of the Russian minority in Estonia 
Estonia gained its first independence in 1920 after having been part of the Russian 
Empire from the beginning of the eighteenth century. This first independence only 
lasted approximately twenty years, as they were incorporated into the USSR in 1940 at 
the beginning of World War II. Estonia was used as a military base for the USSR and 
because it was a part of the Soviet territory, many Russian soldiers and their families 
settled on Estonian territory. The second declaration of independence came in August 
1991 after the dissolution of the USSR, and Estonia was once again an independent 
nation. (Järve 2005: 61f). Dissolution is something which has a way of creating national 
minorities. This has been seen in the former Yugoslavia as well, but it is most obvious 
in the case of the USSR. In the former USSR countries, there are now several ethnic 
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groups within each state, and this situation has been created solely due to the 
dissolution. (Mullerson 1993: 797f). In the first years after the independence ethnic 
nationalism and a negative attitude towards the Russian minority dominated the political 
discourse (Järve 2005: 62). This has to be seen in the light of the fact that the minorities 
in Estonia pre-1940 was around 10 per cent, while this number almost tripled during the 
years of the USSR (Brosig 2006: 140, Jeffries 2004: 131). In continuation of this it has 
to be stated that the Estonian state was the embodiment of the ethnic group of 
Estonians, the ethnic nationalism predated the state so to say. Therefore the Russian 
minority was seen as ‘outsiders’, and is still considered a threat to the Estonian state. 
(Järve 2005: 65). Many Russians did though see Estonia as their home, and quite a few 
of them too voted for the independence. The Estonians did, in spite of this, still consider 
them mistrustful. (Jeffries 2004: 131). The suspicion can be grounded in the fact that 
several ethnic Estonians do believe that Russia has not given up on its thought of re-
establishing their empire, thus local Russians are considered as ‘the hands of Russia’, 
Russian spies in a way, waiting to become a part of their ethnic nation once again and 
regaining control of Estonia. (Järve 2005: 65). The communist legacy is thus a topic to 
attend, as although it might not be as large in Estonia as in other former USSR 
countries, it is still an issue which might have had an effect on the mistrust of the 
Estonians toward the Russian national minority (Jahn & Müller-Rommel 2010: 33). 
One of the problems with the communist legacy was that due to the very centralized 
state in the USSR, the post-communist countries, therefore Estonia as well, suffered 
from weak administrations and almost no professional civil service. Thus, the civil 
servants and civil service needed to be trained, administrative strategies had to be 
developed and new legislation regarding the administration had to be adopted. On top of 
this the legitimacy of the public institutions was also a problem, as they had been used 
to repression during the USSR regime. (Dimitrova 2005: 82f). This mistrust towards the 
former administrations, governed by Russians, might have a large say in the mistrust 
towards the Russian minority, especially in the early years after the independence 
declaration. 
 
As the state-building in Estonia did not start till after the independence was fully 
secured, there was no interference from the USSR. This meant that ethno nationalistic 
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groups could build a state which was based on the cultural and ethnic ground of the 
Estonian people. (Agarin 2010: 90f).  In the state-building it was clear that it was the 
Estonian nation which now had the need for an administration. This was also a clear 
step into making a, maybe unintended, discrimination of the ethnic minorities. It was 
without any pressure from the outside that discussions regarding who was a member of 
the nation took place, and many parties expressed great concerns for the nation’s future, 
making the Russians collectively responsible for these threats towards the nation’s 
future. (ibid.: 88f). The state-building had a negative effect on the discrimination of the 
Russian minority in Estonia, and was in some ways also a clash with the later wish to 
join the EU. In their distancing from the former USSR, they did in some way create 
what did later become an obstacle for the acceptance in the EU. 
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Methods  
In this chapter I will account for my methodological choices in the project. I will start 
out with the strategy for my analysis and discussion, which will be sort of a reader’s 
guide to the project. I will further comment on my empirical choices, which qualitative 
and quantitative data I have chosen to use, its effect on my project, and how I have 
chosen to use the two kinds of data concurrent. I have also accounted for my choice of 
theory and how I have chosen to use the theory further on in the project. Last I have 
presented my philosophy of science, which I have chosen to use only as a framework in 
this project. 
 
Analysis and discussion strategy 
My analysis will have its origin in the Europeanization theory, and will start of by 
analysing what sort of ‘pressure’ the EU has put on Estonia, meaning which criteria 
they have had to live up to, to acquire a membership in the EU. The differences of the 
EU policy and the Estonian policy in terms of minority rights will then be analysed in 
order to find the degree of applicability of Europeanization. Then I will look in to which 
changes there have been made at the domestic level. I will do this using Radaelli’s four 
outcomes of Europeanization as a measure of the impact of the process in Estonia. At 
last I will analyse the speciality of the impact of Europeanization on the Candidate 
Countries, as there are other conditions in the relationship between the EU and Estonia 
in the accession process, than there are when they have become a Member State. The 
analysis will be based primarily on the progress reports from the European Commission, 
which show the development in the time scope of the accession negotiations.  
 
In the discussion I will go in to the findings of the analysis, and try to discuss how they 
affect the minority rights in Estonia. I will have further focus on the actual changes 
made in Estonia. I will do this by looking at different numbers on the development in 
Estonia on the minority rights and then put it into the perspective of the EU by 
discussing the actual effect of Europeanization in the given situation. I will discuss if 
the criteria set out by the EU have been fulfilling, if there are still problems present in 
Estonia and how they were able to become a member in spite of this. Furthermore I will 
discuss some thoughts on the differences and similarities in the Estonian citizenship and 
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the EU citizenship. In this I will also discuss how the EU citizenship has affected the 
naturalization in Estonia. 
 
Qualitative data 
I have selected articles and books explaining the development in Estonia after the 
dissolution of the USSR and the problems with minority rights in Estonia in a historical 
view, and further how the minority rights now are reforming in compliance with the EU 
standards. These texts will help me to understand how the problems with minorities in 
Estonia emerged, and how there has been improvement for the minorities in recent 
years, especially after accession negotiations with, and the acceptance in, the EU. To 
look further into the EU standards on minority rights, I have chosen the Copenhagen 
Criteria, which set the general standards for minority rights in a context of the EU-
enlargement. As the Copenhagen Criteria are part of an official document worked out 
by the EU, it is a good reference point, which tells something about the way the EU 
looks at this problem. Furthermore I have looked into the official progress reports from 
the accession negotiations, which provide an overview of the progress Estonia made on 
the area of minority rights under the negotiations. These also show which problems 
there were, according to the EU, with the Russian minority and how the EU suggests 
that Estonia should cope with the problems. It shows the progress which Estonia has 
made in this field, but also the insufficiency which remains in certain areas. These 
reports are in some ways comparable to the quantitative data, as they help to show the 
progress in the minority rights in Estonia. 
 
Quantitative data 
I have also chosen to include some quantitative data, as I have looked at the Statistical 
Office of Estonia and their 2000 Census, which provides a picture on how the minority 
rights in Estonia were at the time of the census. To somehow measure a development, I 
have also looked at the 2010 Statistical Yearbook of Estonia, to see if the possibilities 
for and discrimination of minorities have improved after the acceptance in the EU. As 
the numbers from the Statistical Yearbook are not fulfilling in comparison to the 2000 
Census, I have found numbers from both Minority Rights Group International, an 
official Estonian homepage, from one of my books and the Estonian Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, to fill the holes which appear in the Statistical Yearbook. These 
numbers range from after 2002, when Estonia was in the accession negotiations, to 
2010, meaning completely new numbers and some before and some after Estonia was 
granted membership in the EU. So they make it possible to measure some of the 
changes in Estonia in compliance with the 2000 Census. 
 
Concurrent triangulation 
Triangulation is the idea of looking at an object from different positions or measuring 
the same thing with different theories (Neumann 2006: 149). There are several ways of 
triangulation, but I limit my use to triangulation of methods, which means that I will 
mix quantitative and qualitative data in my empirical work (ibid.). I will use a 
concurrent triangulation of the data, as I will use both quantitative and qualitative data 
in the discussion, where they will supplement each other, in order to give a more 
complete picture of my findings. I will do this both to strengthen the interpretation of 
my findings, and to study the lack of convergence which may occur. (Creswell et al. 
2003: 229).  
 
Europeanization 
I have chosen the theory Europeanization in order to measure the extent of the pressure 
and outcomes, in order to depict on which differences this makes in Estonia in the area 
of minority rights. The top-down approach of Europeanization provides a good method 
of looking into the way the EU affects the candidate countries, both in the accession 
negotiations and after they become members of the Union. I will though focus mainly 
on the time of the accession negotiations. The general idea of Europeanization will be 
explained given to the account on the work of Andrea Lenschow. Further I have chosen 
to apply Claudio M. Radaelli’s approach, widely focusing on the misfit between the 
supranational level, the EU, and the domestic level, Estonia. He goes into the adaptional 
pressure from the EU on Member States, and how Europeanization affects the policies 
in the interaction between the EU and the Member States. As I mainly study Estonia in 
the accession process, but also after their acceptance in the EU, I have chosen to look 
into the main differences in being a Member State and a Candidate Country. To do this I 
have looked into Heather Grabbe’s application of Europeanization, which widely 
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focuses on the enlargement process. There are both similarities and differences, but I 
will apply Grabbe in order to draw parallels to the Estonian case and what Estonia has 
gone through in the enlargement process, with the asymmetric relationship and the 
uncertainty of being a Candidate Country. 
 
Philosophy of Science - Constructivism 
I have chosen constructivism, which gives me an opportunity to see how constructed 
norms inform new standards when coming from a supranational institution. I will use 
constructivism as a framework, not really going in to the different tools of how it affects 
the subject. In constructivism it is a general thought that reality is socially constructed 
and that it can only be understood in a context (Willis 2007: 54). This means that the 
EU constructs a new reality, in this particular case it is the reality about the rights for 
minorities, and this reality can only be understood in the context of the EU, in relation 
to the particular and unique functions of the EU. Thus, it is clear that constructivism 
creates a framework in which the ideas of the EU is the constructed truth, and this 
affects the Member States as they become actors within this framework. I will use 
Berger and Luckmann’s way of the social constructivism, as they present three terms in 
this norm development; externalization, objectivity and internalization (Rasborg 2009: 
369). The structures and institutions in society are externalized human practice and they 
keep getting revised and created in the every day interaction (ibid.). Here the institutions 
and the unique functions of the EU got developed at first, and keeps developing. After 
some time the institutions get more permanent, meaning they get objectified (ibid.). The 
unique functions and institutions of the EU get locked in a way, and the entire frame of 
the understanding of the EU has been developed. When someone enters the institutions 
they get in to an existing framework, where norms, standards and values are already 
established, and they have to adopt these, meaning they internalize these norms and 
standards (ibid.). When Estonia was in the accession negotiations they had to start this 
internalizing of the norms and standards, meaning they where starting to fulfil the 
criteria which were presented in order to join the EU. They had to adopt the norms of 
the EU in order to become a member. 
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It is this framework which I will use implicitly in this project. The process has already 
been there, so I will not go in to how they had to adopt the norms, simply imply that 
they have adopted them, as they could not have become a member if they had not 
adopted these norms. This is the basic understanding in the project, which will not be 
explicitly analysed further. 
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Europeanization 
I will here present my theory, Europeanization. The chapter will tell the different parts 
of the theory which I have chosen to use, and go from a general definition narrowing 
down the theory into the context of the project. 
 
There are many ways of considering Europeanization. It is not a closed theory or a 
model but is usually considered as a process theory, in which you can examine the 
development in the interaction between states and the EU. When you look at the 
dimensions of Europeanization there are different definitions on this. The most common 
ways to look at it is as a bottom-up theory, although this way looks more or less the 
same as European integration; a top-down theory, which is the most common way of 
looking at the theory; a horizontal transfer theory, more state-to-state theory than the 
others; and as a more cyclical, circular interaction theory, where it involves both 
bottom-up and top-down theory, which is a more dynamic way of considering the 
theory. (Lenschow 2006: 57ff). I have chosen the top-down approach, as it provides a 
framework within which you are able to measure the impact, activated at the EU level, 
of Europeanization at a domestic level. Furthermore, I have chosen to adopt Radaelli’s 
way of looking at Europeanization, meaning, as it covers the domestic impact of the 
public policy of the EU, it is seen as an ‘EU-ization’ (Radaelli 2003: 29). 
 
The top-down approach to the theory concerns widely with the impact of EU policies on 
national policy, i.e. the effects on the goals, instruments, structures and so on 
(Lenschow 2006: 57f). Radaelli summarizes the top-down approach with a simple 
figure or chain:  
 
‘pressure’ from Europe on member states ? intervening variables ? 
reaction and change at the national level (Radaelli 2004: 4). 
 
The chain explains Europeanization under the mechanism, which provides the goodness 
of fit between domestic institutions and European policy (Radaelli 2003: 40). This 
means that the Member States are under adaptional pressure from the EU in policy 
matters. This idea of Europeanization is only applicable when there is a misfit between 
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the domestic level and the European level, because if there is a perfect fit between the 
EU policy and the domestic policy, there will not be any, or very little, adaptional 
pressure, as there is not any real need for change in the existing policy. If there is a high 
degree of misfit, then Member States will find it hard to implement European policy, 
thus creating inertia2 at the domestic level. The two extremes then are a high degree of 
misfit and perfect fit, meaning no misfit at all. Adaptional pressure, and thus a high 
degree of change at the domestic level, will have the greatest impact in the midway of 
these two. (ibid.: 42ff). Meaning that in a Member State having the exact same policy as 
the EU, there is a perfect fit, and Europeanization is unnecessary. But if a Member State 
has some of the same aspects of a policy, though there is a misfit present, then 
Europeanization will be highly applicable and able to make changes in the policy of the 
Member State.  
 
There are three intervening variables, which affect the impact, likelihood and direction 
of Europeanization on the Member States. The first is the institutional capacity to 
produce change. This can be constrained by veto players, formal as well as informal. 
The veto players are part of the macro political system, and in the political process they 
are able to represent serious obstacles, as they might put pressure on the other actors 
involved. Here there is an interaction between policy dynamics and macro political 
structure, although they are lumped together. (ibid.: 46f). This means that for example 
NGOs could be informal veto-players. Formal veto-players could on the other hand be 
found among the politicians or civil servants in a Member State. The scope and time of 
the executive leadership also affects the impact. The one of two extremes is an 
integrated leadership, in which Europeanization does not contribute with much of a 
difference. The other is fragmented leadership, where EU-induced change is 
improbable, as there are too many obstacles. The highest impact will most likely happen 
in the midway of these two extremes. (ibid.: 46f). The second variable is the timing of 
European policies. The impact on a Member State relies on whether the country is in a 
process of reform or not, meaning if the timing of a policy is perfect, the process of 
implementing it might already be on the way, though on the other hand it might be an 
obstacle if the policy is to change a domestic policy already in the process in another 
                                                   
2 Inertia in Europeanization will be explained further in Radaelli’s four possible outcomes, which will be 
presented later in the chapter 
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direction. Furthermore, the tempo of the implementation can be manipulated by the 
decision-makers thus, stalling the process. (ibid.: 47f). The third and last variable is 
policy structure and advocacy coalitions, which presents four observations affecting this 
variable. The first of these is technocratic capture potential. This means that there in 
some policy areas is a technocratic elite who can govern the policies, while other 
policies require a wider spectre of actors and it is within this field that the degree of 
technocratic capture potential is found. If a policy is governed by a small technocratic 
elite there is a high degree of technocratic capture potential, but if there is a wider 
spectre of actors the degree is rather low. The second is concerned with the policy 
adoption-implementation balance. The adoption of a policy only concerns with the 
formulation of a policy while the implementation involves several actors thus, making 
the Europeanization process more problematic. The third observation deals with 
political discourse, which provides a rationale and justifies change at policy level. It is 
through discourse that a policy change becomes legitimate. The fourth and final 
observation concerns with the impact of EU policy on domestic advocacy coalitions. 
This provides an integrated framework for analysis of constellations of actors, grouping 
them in coalitions. (ibid.: 48ff).  
 
Radaelli provides four possible outcomes of Europeanization called; inertia, absorption, 
transformation and retrenchment. These cover the extent of change and the direction of 
Europeanization. (ibid.: 37). The first, inertia, is a situation where there is a lack of 
change at domestic level. The problem is that the EU’s policies, choices etc. are too 
dissimilar to the domestic practice. This may take form of delays in transposition or 
even resistance to EU-induced change. A long period of inertia will produce crisis and 
abrupt change. (ibid.). Absorption is the change as adaption, meaning that there is a 
mixture of resilience and flexibility at the domestic level. Some non-fundamental 
changes can be absorbed, but in general no essential structures or political behaviours 
are modified. There is an accommodation of political requirements, but they are not 
fully implemented. (ibid.). Transformation is a paradigmatic change. Here the 
fundamental logic of the political behaviour changes and the system is fully transformed 
in line with the EU policy. (ibid.: 37f). Finally there is retrenchment which presents a 
paradox. This becomes obvious as national policy becomes less ‘European’ than it was. 
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The domestic opposition is strengthened due to the pressure from the EU, as it presents 
a threat to domestic policy. (ibid.: 38). 
 
Europeanization has to be considered in relation to the fact that Estonia has gone 
through a change, as they from the late 1990’s till now went from being a Candidate 
Country in the accession negotiations to becoming a Member State. And though there 
are some similarities between EU Member States and Candidate Countries in 
accordance to Europeanization, there are some main differences which have to be 
considered as well (Grabbe 2003: 317f). In similarities between Member States and 
Candidate Countries can especially the interaction between Europeanization and other 
processes of change, as well as the complexity of actors involved in the policy making 
be named (ibid.). In the main differences, the two most important, Grabbe states, are the 
asymmetry in the relationship between the EU and the Candidate Countries, and the 
uncertainty in the accession process. If we go into the asymmetry first, the first thing 
that creates this gap between the two sides, is the fact that the EU has some great 
benefits to offer the Candidate Countries, which on the other hand have very little to 
offer back. This also has something to do, Grabbe states, with the fact that Candidate 
Countries wish to join the EU more than the EU and its Member States want them to 
join (ibid.). This brings us to the reason that the EU sets the rules for accession, and the 
Candidate Countries have to follow, so you might say that this is a one way relationship, 
from the top and down. The last reason for the asymmetry between these two is that the 
Candidate Countries have very few options to mitigate the impact of EU policies, as i.e. 
existing Member States do. (ibid.). In the field of uncertainty in the accession process, 
there are five dimensions which have to be considered here. The first dimension is the 
policy agenda, which says that i.e. timing, standards, and importance of a policy, all 
create uncertainty. Both recently developed policy areas and areas where Candidate 
Countries have conditions, but there are no Community competences, can create 
uncertainty. An example of an area where there are conditions for the Candidate 
Countries but none for the Community is the area of respect for and protection of 
minorities. There is no single, harmonized model on this area. (ibid.: 318f). The second 
dimension concerns with the hierarchy of tasks, where some sections of the acquis 
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communautaire3 are more important than others, but there is nowhere stated which ones 
are the most important. This has gotten better with the Accession Partnerships, but the 
political agenda can still change from year to year, which then creates uncertainty. The 
third part is the timing of the policy. In the accession process the cost is on the 
Candidate Country, but the benefit does not arise until the end of the negotiations. The 
time scope for implementation of the acquis creates uncertainty as well, as some parts 
might be implemented in the time after the accession, but again it is unclear which ones. 
There are difficulties for the Candidate Countries in trying to stall the impact of 
Europeanization, as the timing is defined and monitored by an annual progress report. 
Again this creates uncertainty and here also some asymmetry. There is uncertainty for 
Candidate Countries as well in the dimension of whom to satisfy. There might be some 
veto-players within the Member States in the EU, trying to stall the accession of a 
Candidate Country because of an issue in this country which the Member State has a 
problem with. (ibid.) An example could be when Slovenia stalled the accession 
negotiations of Croatia, due to border disputes between the two countries. This might 
though also occur in some time during the accession process, even though it has not 
been there at first. This very complex actor constellation might confuse Candidate 
Countries thus, creating uncertainty. The fifth and last dimension concerns with the 
standards and threshold, which cannot be measured quantitatively. The EU set standards 
and judge on the standards as well, but there is no real set of measurement or clear 
indicators. There might be a wide range of tolerance in one area, and then no tolerance 
in another area. It is also dependent on the Candidate Country in play, as somewhere 
some areas of policy becomes a major issue, though it has not been an issue in the 
situation of another Candidate Country. (ibid.: 319ff).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3 The acquis communautaire is the rights and obligations that the EU Member States share 
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Empirical findings 
In this chapter I will present the empirical findings of my project. I will start out with 
the problems in Estonia explaining the challenges with the citizenship and language, 
and the general idea of the Estonian citizenship. I will then go into the EU’s progress 
reports on Estonia in the accession negotiations, explaining their writings on the 
development of the minority rights in Estonia. Finally I will present some numbers on 
the development of the Russian minority since the large Estonian Census in 2000. 
 
Issue of citizenship and language: the two main challenges 
Some of the key features when studying the Russian minority in Estonia is a twofold 
problem: the problem with citizenship on the one hand, and the problem with the 
language on the other hand. They serve as two different problems but they are still 
interdependent, as the language problem is the first obstacle in the gaining of an 
Estonian citizenship. This is for instance due to the fact that the exams for citizenship in 
Estonia all are in Estonian language, thus creating problems for the Russian-speaking 
minority (Järve 2005: 62f). One of the main reasons that the Russian minority does not 
speak Estonian is due to the fact that they came to Estonia during the USSR regime, and 
thus being a part of the USSR, Russian was the mainly spoken language in Estonia 
during these years. As a matter of fact only 13 per cent of the Russian-speaking 
minority was fluent in Estonian as well in 1991. (Smith 2003: 1f). A problem, amongst 
others, which came to exist after the Estonian independence and the new citizenship 
regulations, was the ‘stateless’ people arising. These people were non-citizens, not 
belonging to any country at all. Many of these were Russians as well. They could not 
legally be classed as ‘stateless’ people, rather as ‘persons of undetermined citizenship’, 
but they remain a problem in Estonia regardless of what they are being called (ibid.: 
19). In 1998 the Law on Citizenship was eased a bit, at least when concerning children 
of the so-called stateless people, or non-citizens as they are also called. It stated that 
children, born in Estonia after the 26th of February 1992 by stateless parents who were 
not citizens of any country, did not have to pass an Estonian language test to gain 
citizenship. (Jeffries 2004: 133). This was, as will be mentioned later on as well, in the 
phase of harmonization with the EU standards. This was a first step in the right 
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direction for the Law on Citizenship, although it still did leave out many parts of the 
Russian minority. 
 
The general idea of Estonian citizenship 
When Estonia regained its independence in 1991, all ethnic Estonians were given an 
Estonian citizenship. Furthermore, citizenship was given to all Estonians and members 
of a minority group, i.e. the Swedish minority, and their descendants, who had been in 
the country prior to the years under the USSR, meaning that this was a pre-1940 
citizenship. The Russian settlers were excluded from gaining citizenship, but offered 
citizenship through naturalization, where they had to pass exams in Estonian, as 
mentioned before. This means that a lot of Russians and Russian-speakers have not 
been able or willing to pass the exams thus, not having acquired Estonian citizenship. 
Therefore there are actually many members of minorities in Estonia who ended up 
falling under the category of stateless people. (Järve 2005: 63). There were problems 
with the citizenship all the way from the start, as the only way of gaining Estonian 
citizenship was through naturalization, and the naturalization was not even without the 
precondition of the ‘two plus one’ residence census, meaning that you had to reside 
permanently in Estonia for two years before applying for citizenship and then reside 
permanently a year after the application as well, to be able to attend the exams of the 
naturalization. (Thiele 1999: 14). This also meant that the first date after the 
independence that Russians and other minorities were able to gain a citizenship was the 
30th of March 1993, as it was not possible to have permanent residence in Estonia prior 
to the 30th of March 1990 (ibid.: 15). In January 1995 a new Law on Citizenship was 
enacted, changing the residence period for citizenship from the earlier ‘two plus one’ 
years to ‘five plus one’. This was done even though only 100.000 Russians out of 
approximately 500.000 had obtained citizenship at this point, and half of them, 50.000, 
had obtained it due to the pre-1940 citizenship law, meaning they or their families had 
lived in Estonia prior to 1940. (Jeffries 2004: 131f). It was therefore only 10 per cent of 
the ethnic Russians in Estonia who had gained citizenship through naturalization in 
1995, four years after the first Law on Citizenship was enacted. 
 
 
 17
Minority problems in Estonia in a European perspective 
When Estonia became a member of the EU with the 2004 enlargement, they also 
adopted standards from the EU on minority rights, as set out in the Copenhagen 
Criteria. In the Copenhagen Criteria, also known as the accession criteria, there are three 
main criteria that the Candidate Countries have to live up to, if they want to become 
members of the Union. One of these, and the one I will focus on here, is that the 
candidate country must have achieved: “…stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities…” (EC 1). In this criterion the respect for and protection of minorities is 
mentioned, and therefore these are the basic standards on minorities within their borders 
which the Candidate Countries have to live up to in order to become members of the 
EU. In the acquis communautaire there are 35 chapters, which have to be implemented 
into national legislation by the Candidate Countries to become members of the EU. In 
these 35 chapters there are nowhere mentioned minority rights thus, making the 
Copenhagen Criteria all that more important (EC 2). This is really the only place where 
the minorities are mentioned, also meaning that, before the Copenhagen Criteria were 
enacted in 1994, no rights for minorities were mentioned in accordance with an EU 
membership. 
 
In the official progress reports on the accession negotiations from 1998 and forward to 
2003, the problem with the Russian minority has been issued by the European 
Commission. In 1998 there were still problems in regard to the recommendations from 
the OSCE, especially concerning naturalization of stateless children (EC 4). As 
mentioned earlier, the naturalization process was eased in relation to stateless children 
in late 1998. This was an important issue in the 1999 report, which stated that Estonia 
had followed the recommendations from the previous year and they now had improved 
the standards in this aspect, though with a small note which said that so far only 34 
children had obtained citizenship through the new law, and this number had to be 
improved. There were still other problems in regard to citizenship, where the 
bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirements could be eased as well, as 
they were the main obstacles in securing citizenship. (EC 5). In 2000 more children had 
started to become naturalized through the law amendments from late 1998. Other 
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amendments on the lifting of language and civic tests for disabled people had been 
introduced as well, easing the naturalization process for the disabled. It was stated that 
Estonia now fulfilled the recommendations from the OSCE on citizenship and 
naturalization. (EC 6). The following year the Commission stated that the improvements 
for especially naturalization of minors were on the right path. Generally naturalization 
rate had been decreasing over the last years, and a new language certification system 
was adopted thus, it should accelerate the naturalization progress. It was important 
though that those who had fulfilled the former language requirements were not to pass 
new tests in this area. General reduction of unnecessary technical barriers should be 
applied and sufficient funds should be available to the Citizenship and Migration Board, 
which handle the naturalization process, to ensure an efficient process. (EC 7).  The 
report from 2002 stated that although improvement had been made over the last years, 
especially the legislative process and administrative structure on the field of minorities 
were still insufficient in some areas. The respect for minority language was also 
something that needed to be improved, as there were still shortcomings in this area, in 
spite of recent legislative improvement. The fact that the naturalization rate, though it 
remained at a stable level, was rather low and the fact that there were still many non-
citizens remaining in Estonia were issues to be addressed as improvement was needed 
in these areas. Furthermore Estonia still needed to speed up the naturalization process as 
well as keeping the funds for the process at a fairly high level. (EC 8). The last report on 
Estonian accession was published in 2003. As Estonia in 2002 had fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the issue of minorities is not mentioned in this report, except from 
one sentence in chapter 13 of the acquis, concerning Social Policy and Employment, 
where it is stated that Estonia needs to encourage further integration of the Russian 
minority, especially there is a need for increasing speed and rate of the naturalization 
process. (EC 9). Generally there has been improvement throughout the reports, but it 
remains clear that further steps need to be taken in Estonia, as the Russian minority still 
faces difficulties, and the naturalization process is insufficient in certain areas still.  
 
The EU has its own idea of citizenship. With the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as 
the Treaty of the European Union, the citizenship of the EU was introduced. This 
citizenship is given to: “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State…” 
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(EULEX 1). It presents amongst other things the right to move and reside freely within 
any Member State and the right to stand for municipal and European Parliament 
elections in any Member State in which a national of any Member State resides (ibid.). 
This is in the Treaty of Lisbon broadened to say that the citizenship of the Union is 
additional to and will not replace the national citizenship. Furthermore additions have 
been made in the areas of moving and residing freely and to stand for elections, so 
conditions are now clearer than they were before. (C 83: 56ff). The ground principles 
are though still the same. 
 
The development from the 2000 Census 
Estonia keeps statistics over their population, as many other countries. In 2000 there 
was a large census, where the entire public of Estonia was counted for and put into 
different statistics. To look at the development from the census till now, there has every 
year been published a Statistical Yearbook, and the newest shows numbers on not all 
the same statistics as the 2000 Census, but most of them. To fill the numbers, I have 
looked into the newest numbers from Minority Rights Group International on Estonia, 
and found official numbers from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also 
Estonia.eu, which is an official homepage about Estonia, has been used, as well as a 
table from a book, to get the numbers as updated and precise as possible.  
 
The first numbers I will look at to give an overview is the general population which has 
actually decreased from 1.370.052 in 2000 to 1.340.127 in 2010. This is important as I 
want to look at the ethnic composition now, and how it has developed. In 2000 the 
Russian national minority in Estonia was 351.178, and this number had decreased, as 
well as the total population, so that there in the beginning of 2009 were 342.966 ethnic 
Russians. The total percentage of Russians in the population had not really changed 
though, as the decrease was from 25.63 per cent to 25.59 per cent. (SOE 1, Statistical 
Yearbook of Estonia 2010). In 2008 the percentage of Russians in Estonia had dropped 
to 24.9 per cent according to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (VM 1). So the 
total number of Russians in Estonia has not really changed thus, the important thing to 
look into have to be the change in citizenship and naturalization rate for the Russian 
national minority. In the 2000 Census the number of the population with a Russian 
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citizenship was 86.067, while 1.095.743 (79.98 per cent) had Estonian citizenship. 
(SOE 1). In 2006 the number of Estonian citizenships had increased to 83.6 per cent, 
according to official data from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MR 1). In 
2000 a number of no less than 170.349 people had undetermined citizenship, meaning 
they were stateless. Another disturbing number was that no more than 77.034 born 
Russians had gained an Estonian citizenship, meaning less than every fourth member of 
the Russian national minority had Estonian citizenship in 2000. (SOE 1). In 2010 
1.149.303 had Estonian citizenship, while there were still 97.718 with undetermined 
citizenship, meaning stateless people. (EEU 1). After the acceptance in the EU the 
naturalization rate and speed accelerated in the first years, from 3.706 in 2003 over 
6.523 in 2004 to 7.072 in 2005 (EEU 1, Agarin 2010: 105).  
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Analysis  
In this chapter I will use the Europeanization theory to analyse the impact of the EU on 
the Russian minority’s rights in Estonia, and to analyse which changes there have been 
made in Estonia to improve the rights. 
 
Adaptional pressure from the EU 
I will start with the so-called pressure coming from the EU, to see which areas Estonia 
have had to change some domestic policies and which standards they have had to live 
up to. This point obviously circles around the Copenhagen Criteria. They are the criteria 
which Candidate Countries have to live up to in order to be able to both acquire and 
qualify for a membership of the EU. They have to adopt the full acquis communautaire, 
but in this minority rights are not mentioned explicitly. When they have become 
members of the EU, it is implied that they have also lived up to the criteria and 
standards of the EU in regard to the minority rights. 
 
Is there a misfit 
The EU has standards and in the relations to Estonia there might be a misfit between 
these criteria and standards, and the Estonian citizenship law. The access to citizenship 
is too difficult, and there are these boundaries, such as the ‘two plus one’ year rule, 
which was expanded to ‘five plus one’ year (Thiele 1999: 14). In fact the whole idea of 
the pre-1940 citizenship creates a misfit as it might be said to be too discriminatory to 
the Russian minority, as most of them came to Estonia in the time of the USSR regime 
(Järve 2005: 63). It is also stated in the 2002 progress report that the respect for the 
minority language needed to be improved, in spite of legislative improvement on the 
area (EC 8). This might also raise a question about compliance between legislative 
changes, de jure, and the actual changes in the policy in Estonia, de facto, as they might 
not be fully the same. This does not agree all that well with the Copenhagen Criteria 
saying that Candidate Countries must have achieved: “…respect for and protection of 
minorities…” (EC 1). There is a misfit present here, making adaptional pressure of 
Europeanization possible. Further you might say that, when not gaining an Estonian 
citizenship the Russian minority loses some rights which others, who have Estonian 
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citizenship, have. The misfit is though not too conspicuous, and change in Estonia is not 
unthinkable on grounds of this. 
 
The variables affecting Europeanization 
Affecting the Europeanization’s effect are some variables intervening with the 
immediate impact of EU policy on Estonia. Within the institutional capacity in Estonia, 
there have been problems in the matter of the government not submitting sufficient 
funds to the Citizen and Migration Board, who deals with the naturalization process 
thus, not increasing the speed and rate of the process enough (EC 7). The executive 
leadership seems to be quite integrated, though there have been different obstacles 
pointing at some governmental problems. Problems are especially clear in the 
administrative structure and legislative process in the field of minority rights (EC 8). 
 
Legislative and administrative problems are clearly obstacles affecting the impact of 
Europeanization, and coupled with other problems such as examples of bureaucratic 
delays these seem to demonstrate some parts of a fragmented leadership, but still not too 
obvious problems, and it has to be considered that improvements have been made, 
which points more in the direction of an integrated leadership. You might say that the 
Estonian leadership is placed somewhere in the midway, making Europeanization 
highly probable. The timing of the criteria which Estonia has to live up to has, on the 
area for minorities, been pretty good, as amendments, such as the one on children of 
non-citizens, have already been on its way. Though there were some parts of the OSCE 
recommendations which were not fulfilled, Estonia became aware of the problem, and 
started making some changes. (EC 4, EC 5). There have been no contradictions, 
meaning the EU is going in one direction and Estonia in another. Though the newer 
amendments might have created a bit of stalling along the way, progress has been made 
throughout the period.  
 
In the policy structure in Estonia, there will have to be looked in to the technocratic 
capture potential, which widely lies in the government who implements changes and 
amends the laws. As other problems are seen in the administration and bureaucracy, is 
must be within the elite the policies are adopted. This brings us to the balance between 
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the adoption and implementation. In Estonia adoption is the general way of handling the 
policies, as amendments of existing legislation is fulfilling, and they do not have to 
implement new policies in the minority rights area. This is another factor making the 
impact of Europeanization high in Estonia. 
 
The four possible outcomes of Europeanization 
The analysis now goes in to Radaelli’s four possible outcomes of Europeanization. 
These are inertia, which is a lack of change at the domestic level; absorption, which 
means slowly adapting changes; transformation, meaning a complete behavioural 
change; and retrenchment, which is a narrowing of European policy in Estonia.  
 
The changes which have been made in Estonia due to the adaptional pressure from the 
EU and in spite of the obstacles from the different intervening variables are many. The 
first amendment which was made rather early in the process was on the children of non-
citizens (EC 4). The next amendments came on the area of disabled who got the 
language and civic tests lifted, so acquirement of citizenship thus became easier (EC 6). 
Also in the area of the general language test came a new certification system, which 
should ease and speed up naturalization (EC 7). But though amendments were made in 
several policy areas, there were still the bureaucratic and administrative lack which was 
most clear in the fact that there were problems with insufficient funds for the Citizen 
and Migration Board in the reports from both 2001 and 2002 (EC 7, EC 8).  
 
There have been no real lack of change in Estonia; there were dissimilarities between 
the EU policy and the Estonian practice, but they did not block changes from taking 
place. It is then clear that there has not been an outcome of inertia. When looking at the 
domestic level in Estonia, it becomes obvious that the policy from the EU has not 
presented a threat to the Estonian policy, and the policy in Estonia has, if any, become 
more European in contrary to less European. Thus, there has not been retrenchment on 
the domestic level in Estonia. There have been too many obstacles in Estonia though to 
fully perform a transformation of the domestic policy. Different areas still lack 
improvement to fully comply with the EU policy on minority rights, and the 
behavioural change has not been seen either. There have been flexibility and will to 
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change the policy on minority rights and citizenship. Amendments have been made to 
ease the naturalization process; a new language certification system, citizenship for 
children of non-citizens and lifting of language and civic tests for disabled have all been 
introduced. But there is still resilience in some ways. Estonia has not fully implemented 
all requirements, but they have been accommodated, they have not modified any 
essential structures or political behaviour, but absorbed some of the non-fundamental 
changes through the amendments. These all comply with absorption, and it is thus clear 
that Europeanization has an outcome in Estonia which lies within absorption. They are 
reluctant in some areas, slowly adapting the changes, but still moving forward with 
small changes on the path. 
 
How was Estonia as a Candidate Country different? 
The last part of the analysis will go in to the different issues which have made the 
Europeanization of Estonia different, as it was a Candidate Country until 2004, and in 
the period which I analyse.  
 
The first issue I will analyse is the asymmetry in the relationship between Estonia and 
the EU. It has been a top-down relationship between the two, as in the accession 
negotiations Estonia have had to fulfil the criteria set out by the EU in order to acquire 
the membership. It is clear that Estonia do wish to join the EU, as they generally follow 
the recommendations from the EU. It might be costly, as they need to get sufficient 
funds in the area of minority rights, but in the end they will get the monetary reward 
that it is to join the EU. You might say that putting sufficient funds in an area is a good 
investment, if it generates an EU membership which is more rewarding than what it has 
cost to join. 
 
The uncertainty of being a Candidate Country has obviously affected Estonia in the 
accession negotiations as well. The timing, standards and importance of the policy on 
the minority rights might not have been the most important in the whole accession 
progress. But as it is a criterion for accession, it has been of some importance. It is 
though an area where the criteria for the Candidate Countries exceed the conditions 
within the Community. It is an area recently put into the legislative parts of the Union 
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and this made it an unclear area in the accession negotiations and created uncertainty for 
Estonia. The time scope of the implementation might have created uncertainty as well, 
as in the final report there are still some lack in the area for minority rights, but Estonia 
did get accepted in the EU anyway. They did fulfil the general requirements, but 
improvement could be made, this is a confusing statement in some ways. Further 
Estonia has not been able to stall the implementation of the policy in the same way as if 
they had been a Member State, as the annual reports have monitored the progress in the 
area. One thing that might have created uncertainty as well is that the first statements 
claim that they have to live up to the recommendations made by the OSCE. When they 
did fulfil the recommendations from the OSCE, there were still parts of the area of 
minority rights which had to be improved. This has created some uncertainty in the area 
of which actors are present in process, and which recommendations in the end has to 
fulfilled. They set of having to fulfil the recommendations from the OSCE, but when 
they do, they have to fulfil further requirements. (EC 4, EC 6). At last it is unclear how 
the EU measures the fulfilling of the standards they set out. In Copenhagen Criteria it 
says “…respect for and protection of minorities…” (EC 1), but there are not set any 
clear indicators on what is respect for and protection of minorities, and when do you 
fulfil the criterion. It is not clear if this has been a key issue to the EU or if great 
tolerance has been issued. There is a great uncertainty, especially when, as it is the 
matter for Estonia, some areas lack improvement, but in the end they are granted a 
membership in spite of this. 
 
Summing up the analysis 
The adaptional pressure from the EU on Estonia is presented through the Copenhagen 
Criteria. There has been found a misfit between the EU’s policy and the Estonian 
policy, but not a too conspicuous misfit thus, Europeanization is applicable. There have 
been some institutional, administrative problems present in Estonia creating obstacles to 
Europeanization. The likelihood of a great impact of Europeanization in Estonia is 
though high, as there are many requirements present in the Estonian policy area for the 
impact to take place. As there have been flexibility and reluctance in the implementation 
of the criterion of minority rights present in Estonia, it has been found that the key 
outcome of Europeanization in Estonia is absorption. As Estonia was a Candidate 
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Country there were clear asymmetry in the relationship between the EU and Estonia in 
the time of the accession negotiations. Uncertainty for Estonia was created as it was 
unclear how important the standard on the area was, but also what the actual standards 
were and how they were measured. All together you might say that Estonia has been 
affected by the Europeanization on the matter of minority rights. They have improved 
greatly, but still lack improvement in some areas in the time of the accession. The 
uncertainty is still present, as they most likely have had to fulfil some of the 
requirements even after their acceptance in the EU. 
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Discussion 
I will now discuss the findings of my analysis in the aspect of the acceptance of Estonia 
in the EU. I will go in to the numbers on the development in Estonia, and discuss how 
the acceptance in the EU has affected the rights of the Russian minority. Further I will 
discuss on what might have affected the changes in Estonia in continuation of the EU 
membership.  
 
There are some standards which Candidate Countries, like Estonia, have to adopt to 
acquire a membership of the EU, but after the acceptance in the EU, there have been no 
explicit standards to live up to as a Member State. The problem is that there are still 
problems for the Russian minority in Estonia, as citizenship continues to be based on 
taking exams in Estonian language, and has been since the Estonian independence in 
1991. I have found in the analysis that there is to some extent a misfit between the 
standards set out by the EU and the minority rights in Estonia. And as these problems 
have not been fully erased with the acceptance in the EU, there might be a problem with 
them ever being fully solved, at least in an EU context. The question is further, if the 
rights for the Russian minority have changed all that much? 
 
The criteria on minority rights set out by the EU are not as clear as some might wish 
them to be, as the Copenhagen Criteria seem to be too broad and unclear in their 
definition. Furthermore, other criteria are more important when trying to become a 
member of the EU, i.e. the economic standards. (Smith 2003: 4). As the EU has no real 
capacity to monitor human rights standards, the minority rights standards within the EU 
are basically based on Candidate Countries to have; joined the CoE and; compliance to 
recommendations from the OSCE, set out by the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM). If Candidate Countries fulfil these two aspects, they basically fulfil 
the standards on minority rights of the EU. (Brosig 2006: 142ff). This is shown on 
writings in the progress reports as well, where it is stated that Estonia has to live up to 
the recommendations from the OSCE (EC 4, EC 6). There is though some monitoring 
through the progress reports, which keeps the Candidate Countries in line with what 
they need to improve and achieve to become a member. The requirements are in general 
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still the recommendations from the OSCE, so there are no real, explicit EU standards on 
the matter. 
 
To go a bit further in to the development in minority rights in Estonia the first thing 
which I will look at is some of the numbers. In the early years of the accession 
negotiations not much had happened in Estonia on the rights for the Russian national 
minority. In 1995 approximately 50.000 ethnic Russians had gained citizenship through 
naturalization, and in 2000 that number had only had a minor increase, as the number 
was 77.034. As quite a few of these were considered as non-citizens prior to their 
naturalization, the numbers of a decrease in non-citizens from 2000 to 2010 might be 
appropriate to put in to context here. This number decreased from 170.349 to 97.718, 
which is a fairly high decrease. Taking into account that not much had happened with 
the naturalization of the Russian minority prior to 2000 and the early years of accession 
negotiations, it might be considered that the negotiations and the actual accession have 
affected these numbers to some extent. To draw on my findings in the analysis, this says 
that the amendments being made are helpful for the minority rights in Estonia, but as 
the outcome of the Europeanization and therefore the impact in Estonia only is 
absorption, you do see that further changes might need to be done. Slowly adopting the 
EU policy on the area is a process which will take time, but it is though a step in the 
right direction. There continues to be many ethnic Russians in Estonia, as the number 
has not really decreased from 2000 till now, and the problem has not been fully erased. 
 
When finding out that some of the problems still exist in Estonia, it is important to ask, 
if the criteria set out by the EU on this matter are fulfilling? In some ways it would be a 
clear no, because all of the problems have not vanished. But changes have though been 
made, and improvements in many areas are on its way due to amendments in the Law 
on Citizenship. These amendments are made to fulfil the criterion of the Copenhagen 
Criteria on minority rights, so the pressure from the EU has affected the rights to some 
extent. It is though a slow absorption and they have not finalized the improvements in 
the area. Still Estonia did become a member of the EU, in spite of continuing problems 
with the Russian minority. This might have to be seen as an acceptance of the work in 
the area, and the fact that they have lived up to rest of the acquis as well. The minority 
 29
rights standards are not, as already mentioned, the most important thing in the 
acceptance of a Member State in the EU, and therefore improvements might just be 
enough if the rest of the criteria are fulfilled as well. 
 
From 2000 to 2006 there was though an increase in the percentage of people with 
Estonian citizenship, from just under 80 per cent to 83.6 per cent. This might have been 
affected by the different amendments in the Law on Citizenship in Estonia, and these 
were made partly due to the forthcoming membership of the EU. So in a way the EU 
membership might have affected this increase in Estonian citizenships, but it has to be 
noted that this is only an assumption, as other factors might have affected it too. 
Another thing which speaks in favour of the EU membership having had an effect on 
the increase is the fact that immediately after Estonia joined the Union, there was an 
increase in the naturalization rate, which nearly doubled from 2003 to 2005. This might 
also have something to with the incentive of an EU citizenship in addition to the 
Estonian citizenship after the acceptance in the EU. The EU citizenship gives the right 
to move and reside freely within Member States of the Union, and this is something 
which might have had clear effect on the increase in naturalization. The EU citizenship 
provides lots of opportunities, which Estonians, and especially non-citizens, have not 
had earlier on. This will though equal the assumption that the citizenship problems not 
solely are a problem which can be solved by the Estonian authorities, but also might 
have something to do with the will of the ethnic Russians to gain Estonian citizenship.  
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Conclusion 
When Estonia gained its second independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the 
USSR, a large Russian national minority had emerged within Estonian borders. 
Problems with Estonian citizenship and discrimination on grounds of language came 
along for the Russian minority. The accession negotiations with the EU has been part of 
a process which has improved the rights for the Russian minority in Estonia, and the 
acceptance in the EU is, to some extent, an acceptance of the progress made in Estonia. 
Therefore I found it interesting to study how the rights of the Russian minority in 
Estonia had been changed within the context of the relation between Estonia and the 
EU. 
 
The rights for the Russian minority in Estonia have changed, due to amendments in the 
Law on Citizenship. These amendments were made partly because of the pressure laid 
down by the EU on Estonia through their accession negotiations. The impact of 
Europeanization has been noticeable, and the Estonian government is slowly adopting 
the policy changes into their own policy. Estonia has fulfilled the criteria and 
implemented the standards set out by the EU on the area for minority rights, and 
therefore the path to a membership of the Union was clear on this matter. After Estonia 
became a member of the EU, there has been further acceleration in the naturalization 
rate, to some extent due to the incentive which the EU citizenship has represented to 
some of the former non-citizens. Problems do though continue to exist in Estonia, and 
further steps need to be taken in an EU context, so the problems in the longer run can be 
fully solved. 
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Perspectives on the project 
I will now put my project into perspective, and try to discuss how the limitations of my 
project have affected the outcome. I will further explain which new problems have 
arisen through my work with the project. 
 
In a project like this the time scope is always a limitation which you have to be aware 
of. I have not had the time or funds to make a study in Estonia, to produce my own 
empirical data on other parts of the ethnic problems than I have been able to find on 
different homepages or in books. This might have given an extra dimension to the 
project, but I have from the start been well aware of the fact that this has not been a 
possibility. I have also limited myself from making an interview with an expert on the 
Estonian case, as I have felt that it would not have provided too much additional 
information to the project, which I could not find in the books. It would of course have 
provided me with the opportunity to make questions in areas where I have felt that my 
empirical knowledge has been limited to some extent, but I feel that I have taken the 
right methodological choices, which have provided sufficient information in order to 
write the project which I have wanted. 
 
Through the project I have found that after Estonia joined the EU, a new treaty has been 
enacted. With this new treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon, the rights for minorities have been 
incorporated in an article. As it says in Article 2 of the TEU: “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities…” 
(C 83: 17). This is of course a rather new article, and studies on the matter might not be 
fulfilling at the moment. This is also the reason why I have chosen not to go further into 
this article, and also because the time which I have chosen to study in the project is 
prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. But in future studies, the effect of this new article will be 
an extremely interesting aspect on projects which study minority rights in the EU.   
 
One of the main assumptions I have found in the outcome of this project, and a very 
interesting problem to study further, is the will of the non-citizens to acquire an 
Estonian citizenship. This project works with the idea that the problem only lies within 
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the Estonian government, and that it is their discrimination of the minorities which 
solely has slowed the process of naturalization. But as the increase in non-citizens 
gaining Estonian citizenship accelerated just after Estonia’s acceptance in the EU, the 
incentives might have been enhanced for the non-citizens. It could also be interesting to 
go into the Estonian administration, and to look further into how they have acted in the 
implementation of the policy, and to look at which other actors have had an effect on 
the different amendments and stalling in the policy process within Estonia. A further 
study of the importance of different criteria and parts of the acquis could be interesting 
as well. How important the minority rights are, compared to i.e. the economic efforts, 
the general political structure and so on. It could in continuation of this be interesting to 
see if the importance differs from one Candidate Country to another and which 
countries the different parts are important in. 
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